Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1

Article 9

1994

Lanham Act Does Not Cover Consumer Claims
Travis Ketterman

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Travis Ketterman Lanham Act Does Not Cover Consumer Claims, 7 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 31 (1994).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol7/iss1/9

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

purchase goods through the rent-to-own agreements
and the actual value of the goods. However, it argued,
that it offered services, such as free delivery and
maintenance, which justified the higher cost, and this
presented a factual issue as to whether it charged
excessive interest. The court, however, found that DEF
offered no real evidence of the value of such services.
As a result, the court concluded that no reasonable
factfinder would find that the large disparity between
the prices DEF charged and the value of the goods and
services DEF offered fell within the amount allowed by
the usury statute.
Addressing the fourth element of usury, the court
stated that while DEF did not intend to violate the usury
law, it did intend to charge an excessive rate of interest,
which is all that is required by the statute. Therefore,
the supreme court concluded that that lower court
correctly found no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether DEF violated the usury statute and therefore
properly granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on their usury claim.
RPAA

and CCSA offer choice of remedies

Finally, DEF contended that the RPAA, enacted in
1990, effectively repealed the CCSA. In analyzing this

issue, the supreme court examined both the language
and legislative history of the RPAA and concluded that it
did not expressly repeal the CCSA. In so ruling, the court
noted in particular that the RPAA that stated that the
remedies offered "shall not be construed as restricting
any remedy that is otherwise available." The court also
observed that while the legislature had considered
repealing the CCSA and had even included such wording
in the original statute, it later adopted amendments that
deleted such provisions. Because the legislature did not
expressly state its intent to repeal the CCSA or restrict
the consumer's remedies to those listed in the RPAA, the
court held that the plaintiffs were not barred from
seeking a remedy under the CCSA. Furthermore, the
court did not find that the two laws were in irreconcilable conflict with one another. Rather, it held that the
two laws could be interpreted to offer cumulative
remedies for consumer protection.
In concluding, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that all rent-to--own transactions must be treated as
consumer credit sales, as defined by the CCSA, and that
rent-to-own customers were entitled to statutory
protections. It affirmed summary judgment for the
plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial court for the
determination of damages.

Lanham Act does not cover consumer claims
By Travis Ketterman
In Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp.,
Inc., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993), the
Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that consumers do not have
standing to bring false advertising
claims under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Additionally, the court held that the
1988 amendment to the Lanham Act
did not broaden its jurisdiction to
include consumer claims.
The Lanham Act, as enacted in
1946, regulates and protects
trademarks; in addition, it protects
persons engaged in commerce from
the "deceptive and misleading use of
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the marks." The 1946 statute
provided a cause of action for
persons engaged in commerce when
another person knowingly uses false
advertising in the merchandising of
goods and services. In 1988,
Congress modified Section 43(a) to
authorize "any person who believes
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such acts" to bring a cause
of action under the Lanham Act in
federal court. In a consolidated
appeal, the Third Circuit addressed
whether the original Lanham Act, or
its more recent modification, was
sufficiently broad to give standing to
consumers who did not assert any
commercial interest or injury.

In 1990, Sara Serbin and George
Baker purchased new automobiles in
separate transactions. At the time of
these purchases, each also purchased
a "Super Rust Protection" policy
from the defendants, Ziebart
International Corporation and
Ziebart Company (collectively
referred to as Ziebart). Subsequently, Serbin and Baker brought
suit against Ziebart in the U.S.
District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, alleging
that defendants' advertisements
about "Super Rust Protection"
contained false representations
which misled them into purchasing
the additional policy. Moreover, they
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contended that Ziebart had knowingly made these false
statements. Alleging to have been misled by Ziebart's
representations into purchasing a policy that duplicated
protection already extended to new automobile buyers
through standard manufacturers' warranties, Serbin and
Baker brought claims under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act as well as pendant state law. They also
sought class certification on behalf of all persons who
had purchased the "Super Rust Protection" in connection with a new auto purchase.
The District Court granted Ziebart's motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under
the Lanham Act. It ruled that only a party with a
"reasonable and cognizable" commercial interest that
has been or potentially might be injured by the alleged
violation has standing to bring a claim. The court did
not recognize Serbin and Baker, as consumers, to have
such commercial interests. In addition, the court
dismissed the state claims without prejudice.
In the second case consolidated for appeal, Sheilah
Guarino brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey against Sun Company, Inc., Sun
Refining & Marketing Company, and Wells, Rich, and
Greene, Inc. (collectively referred to as Sun). In her
complaint, Guarino alleged that Sun had knowingly
used false advertising to promote purchasing of its
highest octane gasoline. She brought suit under both
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and pendant state law.
Guarino also sought class certification on behalf of all
persons who had purchased the high octane gasoline
from April 1, 1990 through the date of class certification.
The District Court granted Sun's motion for summary judgment on the basis that consumers had no
standing to bring a claim under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. In its ruling, the court recognized that
granting consumers standing to bring suit would
broaden the Lanham Act from a regulation of unfair
competition to a catchall consumer protection statute.
The court suggested that if such expansion was desirable, it should be done by Congress.
Consolidating these two cases on appeal, the Third
Circuit first addressed the issue of whether a consumer
had standing to bring a cause of action under the
Lanham Act. In its analysis, the court looked to legal
precedents from its sister circuits.
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The Third Circuit first turned to the influential
Second Circuit case, Colligan v. Activities Club of New
York, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), for guidance. In
Colligan, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
false advertising suit filed by high school students
against the promoters of a ski weekend. The Circuit
Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that "any
person," as used in Section 43(a), unambiguously
granted consumers a cause of action. In its review of
the legislative history of the Lanham Act, the Second
Circuit declared that Congress intended to create a
"special and limited unfair competition remedy" that
protected commercial interests from unfair commercial
conduct, but did not protect consumer interests.
Additionally, the Third Circuit found further
guidance to interpret Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
from several decisions from the Ninth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. In addressing the issue of standing,
the Ninth Circuit declared that the dispositive question
for determining Section 43(a) standing was whether the
plaintiff had a "reasonable interest to be protected
against false advertising." Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1981). In Smith, the Circuit Court held
that a movie actor could file suit under Section 43(a)
against film producers who substituted the name of
another actor for his in screen credits and movie
advertisements because the actor had a reasonable
interest in having his name associated with his work.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit also held that the
false advertising in dispute must result in some type of
unfair competition. Halicki v. UnitedArtists Communication, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). In Halicki,
the Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment to a movie distributor and several
movie theaters who were sued by a movie producer for
falsely advertising a "PG" movie as an "R" rated
movie. Since the plaintiff's claim alleged false advertising about the quality of the product and not unfair
competition, the court held that the action did not fall
within the ambit of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Ninth Circuit eventually resolved the apparent
conflict between Smith and Halicki concerning the role
of competition in Section 43(a) claims. In Waits v.
Frito-Lay,978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), the plaintiff, a
singer, successfully sued the defendant for imitating his
well-known voice in a radio commercial. In finding for
Pleasesee "Falseadvertising" on page 37
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Court finds no manufacturer liability in child's death
By Bryan M. Sims
In Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 21
F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994), the
Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a disposable
lighter manufactured by Bic
Corporation (Bic) was not unreasonably dangerous as to require
imposing strict liability upon its
manufacturer. It further held that for
product liability analysis, Illinois
law dictates the use of the consumer
contemplation test, which examines
the expectation of the "ordinary
consumer." In so ruling, the court
narrowed the scope of liability for a
manufacturer by eliminating the use
of the risk utility test in cases where
the product design is simple and the
danger obvious.

Fire claims a child's life
In March 1988, Cori Smith, age
four, obtained a lighter belonging to
one of the adult smokers in a home
shared by the Smith and Todd
families. Although Cori started a
small fire in her parents' bedroom,
the flames were extinguished before
any damage was sustained.
Following this incident, the
adults in the household warned Cori,
as well as the other five children in
the house, about the dangers of
playing with matches and lighters.
However, on the morning of March
27, 1988, Cori found a Bic lighter
on a table in the living room. She set
fire to some papers which were on
the floor of the bedroom where
twenty-two month old Tiffany Todd
slept. The adults, who had been
asleep, did not awaken in time to
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prevent the fire from spreading.
Tiffany died in the blaze.
Rodney Todd, Sr., Tiffany's
father and administrator of her
estate, brought suit against Bic in a
diversity action in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. In his complaint, Todd
alleged that Bic was negligent and
strictly liable for selling a defective
product. He claimed that the lighter
was unreasonably dangerous
because it lacked a child-resistant
feature and failed to provide
adequate warning of potential
dangers. The disputed warning read
"KEEP OUT OF THE REACH OF
CHILDREN."
The District Court granted
summary judgment for Bic. It found
that the lighter was not defective
because it provided the small flame
it was intended to provide. Moreover, the court held that the
manufacturer's warning was
adequate. It also dismissed Todd's
public policy arguments for holding
Bic strictly liable, stating that
"public policy only requires holding
manufacturers and sellers liable if
their product is found to be defective
or unreasonably dangerous." Todd
subsequently appealed to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On review, a divided appellate
panel reversed the District Court's
grant of summary judgment for the
defendant. The full circuit court
subsequently vacated that order,
reheard the case en banc, and
unanimously agreed that the
warning on the lighter was adequate.
Additionally, it also certified two
questions of state law to the Illinois
Supreme Court: (1) whether the

court must consider the "foreseeable
user" under the consumer contemplation test; and (2) whether the
risk-utility test was applicable.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court
declined certification. In light of the
Illinois court's silence, the Seventh
Circuit looked to other persuasive
authority to properly interpret
Illinois law on these issues.

Lighters not too dangerous
On appeal, Todd first contended
that Bic was strictly liable for
damages because the lighter it
manufactured was unreasonably
dangerous under the consumer
contemplation test. According to the
consumer contemplation test, a
product is unreasonably dangerous if
it is dangerous beyond that which is
contemplated by the ordinary
consumer. If the product is used
properly and it fails to perform in its
expected manner, a manufacturer
may be held strictly liable for the
resulting injuries.
After its review, the Seventh
Circuit held that the disputed lighter
performed exactly as expected. The
court noted that the ordinary
consumer would anticipate that,
when used correctly, the Bic lighter
would produce a small flame.
Additionally, the ordinary consumer
would predict that when the small
flame is placed in contact with a
combustible material, such as paper,
a larger flame would be produced.
The court concluded that while a
lighter may be dangerous because it
can start a fire, it is not dangerous to
the extent of being unreasonable.
Therefore, the Circuit Court held
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that since the lighter performed in a
manner consistent with the expectation of the ordinary consumer, it was
not unreasonably dangerous and Bic
was not strictly liable.
Todd next argued that the
consumer contemplation test should
consider the expectation of the
foreseeable user, instead of only the
ordinary consumer. For purposes of
the appeal, Bic had conceded that
children were foreseeable users of
its lighter. Therefore, Todd contended that the court improperly
granted summary judgment because
it failed to include children in its
consumer contemplation test
analysis.
Turning to this issue, the Circuit
Court declared that Illinois law
clearly indicates that the applicable
standard in the consumer contemplation test is the expectation of the
ordinary consumer. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that children,
unlike ordinary consumers, do not
possess the knowledge common to
the community, and as a result, their
expectations are inappropriate for
consideration in the consumer
contemplation test. In addition, the

court warned that allowing such a
standard would result in absolute
liability for manufacturers because
children do not perceive the dangers
that are inherent in every product.
For these reasons, the court concluded that it is inappropriate to
consider the expectations of the
foreseeable user in the consumer
contemplation test.

Test not always applicable
Todd then argued that the district
court's failure to consider the riskutility test, in addition to the
consumer contemplation test,
mandated reversal of the summary
judgment. He insisted that the
lighter might be unreasonably
dangerous under either test. Under
the risk-utility test, a product is
unreasonably dangerous, even when
it meets consumer expectations, if:
(1) the defective design is excessively dangerous and preventable;
and (2) the risk of danger in the
design outweighs the benefits.
The Seventh Circuit observed
that, in certain cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court has adopted the

risk-utility test. However, in such
situations, the product in controversy was complex and the risk it
presented was not obvious. In the
case at hand, it found the lighter was
a simple and obviously dangerous
product. The Circuit Court held that
the risk-utility test would not apply
to a simple but obviously dangerous
product because it was unlikely that
the Illinois Supreme Court would
apply the test to such a product.
The Circuit Court then addressed
two final issues: (1) whether the
warning was adequate; and (2)
whether the manufacturer was
negligent. It affirmed the District
Court's holding that the warning
was adequate. The court also found
that Bic was not negligent because
the product was not unreasonably
dangerous. Therefore, Bic did not
breach its duty to produce a reasonably safe product. In so finding, the
Circuit Court concluded that an
ordinary disposable cigarette lighter
is not unreasonably dangerous so as
to warrant holding its manufacturer
negligent or strictly liable.
Please see "Lighter liability" on page 38

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act awards limited
By Judith Gorske
In Wright v. FinanceServ. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F3d
647 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the executor of a decedent's estate
had standing to sue a debt collection agency under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692 to 1692o, for violations involving letters sent
by the agency to the decedent. The court also held that
Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the FDCPA limits additional
damages to $1,000 per proceeding.
Gladys Finch died in October, 1989. After her death,
Finance Service of Norwalk (Finance Service), a debt-
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collection agency, sent Finch 14 letters attempting to
collect $112 for an allegedly overdue medical bill.
Betty Wright, acting as executor for the estate, notified
Finance Service of Finch's death. The agency then
discontinued its correspondence.
Wright then filed a complaint against Finance
Service in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, alleging a total of 30 FDCPA violations
contained within the 14 letters Finance Service had sent
Finch. Subsequently, both parties moved for partial
summary judgment. Wright sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of the 30 alleged FDCPA violations. Finance Service moved for partial summary
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